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Departing from the concept of Civic Culture, this paper aims to understand how 
the political discourse of populist leaders affects citizens’ orientations towards 
the political system. Latin America offers some of the most representative 
cases of populism, as well as significant negative cases, where populism has not 
occurred. Using the comparative method this study provides clues about the 
consequences of populism. It analyzes the content of the political discourses of 
two presidents in Latin America: Rafael Correa and Jose Mujica. Quantitative 
discourse analysis reveals important aspects of these leaders’ discourses. Next, 
this study compares citizens’ political culture before and during the presidents’ 
terms. Findings reveal interesting clues about populism’s causes and effects that 
could be found in the relationship between political discourses and political 
culture.
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discurso PoPulista y cultura Política: PersPectivas 
desde américa latina
Partiendo del concepto de Cultura Política, esta investigación intenta 
comprender cómo el discurso de líderes populistas influye las orientaciones 
de los ciudadanos hacia el sistema político. América Latina ofrece algunos de 
los casos más representativos de populismo, así como casos donde éste no ha 
ocurrido. Usando el método comparado este estudio provee pistas sobre las 
consecuencias del discurso populista. Se analiza el contenido de los discursos 
políticos de dos presidentes de América Latina: Rafael Correa y José Mujica. 
El análisis cuantitativo del discurso revela importantes aspectos en los discursos 
de estos líderes. Luego, este estudio compara algunos aspectos de la cultura 
política de la ciudadanía antes y durante los períodos de gobierno de estos 
presidentes. Los resultados revelan interesantes pistas sobre las causas y efectos 
del populismo que pueden ser observados en la relación entre discursos y 
cultura política. 
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Introduction: Latin America’s Left Turn and Civic Culture
In the late 1990s, Latin American countries experienced a widespread shift in the 
ideological preferences of their governments. As Levitsky and Roberts (2011) have 
pointed out, this ‘turn’ began with the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 
1998 and continued over the next decade in each subsequent election of the leaders 
of the ‘Latin American left turn’. Currently, two-thirds of Latin American presidents 
belong to this group. The success of leftist leaders stemmed from the financial crisis, 
social inequality, and the poor economic performance of the countries due to pro-
market measures implemented by right wing governments in previous decades 
(Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 2-9). This new left stormed onto the political scene 
with a discourse of renewal of the old struggles of their predecessors in the seventies. 
The main features of their rhetoric were equality, equity, redistribution and extensive 
state involvement in the economy, as well as the rejection of neoliberal policies 
(Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). In this context, Rafael Correa and José Mujica’s first 
elections occurred in 2006 and 2009, respectively. 
Despite these similarities, not all Latin America’s leftist governments can be considered 
equivalent. At least two elements highlight the differences among them. On the one 
hand, their discourses express two different types of ideological positions with respect 
to the political system they inherit: extreme leaderships (those who propose a break 
with the political system) and moderate leaderships (those who propose measured 
economic reforms). In a left-right spectrum, leaders like Chávez in Venezuela or 
Correa in Ecuador are located towards the extreme left, while Bachelet in Chile is 
located towards the moderate center. On the other hand, left-turn presidents show 
wide differences in their political styles, or the way they dramatize their political 
goals. Differences in their charismatic leadership are obvious. One can recognize 
prominent populist features in leftist leaders like Chávez in Venezuela or Correa in 
Ecuador, while presidents such as Morales in Bolivia, Bachelet in Chile and Mujica 
in Uruguay show more moderate characteristics (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). 
Moreover, Levitsky and Roberts (2011) propose a typology of left governments 
in Latin America based on two dimensions: (1) the level of institutionalization 
and (2) the locus of political authority. “The first dimension distinguishes between 
established party organizations and new parties or movements. (…) The second 
dimension distinguishes between parties or movements that concentrate power in 
the hands of a dominant personality and those that disperse power more broadly 
within a party organization or social movement networks” (Levitsky and Roberts, 
2011: 12). This implies Correa and Mujica’s governments are located on opposite 
sides of the authors typology (Table 1).
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Table 1.
A typology of governing left parries in Latin America




Electoral professional Left (PSCH in 
Chile, PT in Brazil)












Source: Levitsky and Roberts (2011:13)
Populism does not only belong to leftist governments or leaders. Nevertheless, a 
comparison of cases of the occurrence and non-occurrence of populism in “the 
same” ideological spectrum could help us to understand its causes and effects. Indeed, 
beyond the description of Latin American leftist governments, we are focused on 
the populist features its leaders express (or don’t). 
Literature concerned about the relation between populism and democracy can 
be summarized as two opposing perspectives: populism as a threat to democracy 
and populism as a reinforcer of democracy. These perspectives come from views 
of democracy as an individual’s right (liberal democracy) or democracy as the rule 
of majority, respectively. For instance, De la Torre (2013: 27) notes that populism 
affects the relation between people and political institutions because it promotes 
“direct communication channels between the leader and ‘his people’”, rather than 
participative forms of democracy. Notwithstanding this discussion, Panizza (2008) 
points out the limits of both perspectives: 
Those who argue that populism is fundamentally democratic because 
it gives voice to the excluded and claims for popular sovereignty, should 
consider all cases of movements and populist regimes that have not 
been democratic. On the other hand, those who argue that populism 
is a degeneration of democracy should consider the genuine popular 
support enjoyed by populist leaders (Panizza, 2008:83).
The question of how populist discourse affects citizens’ attitudes remains unclear. 
Nevertheless, there have been recent experimental approaches to the study of 
the reception of populist style and rhetoric among voters. For instance, Bos, van 
der Brug and de Vreese (2012) found that populist style affects citizens’ perceived 
legitimacy of right-wing populist leaders. To enhance our understanding of how 
populism engages with citizens’ attitudes and perspectives in democracies we have 
looked into the main lines of Almond and Verba’s classic work The Civic Culture 
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(1963). This seminal study departs from a psycho-political perspective that stresses 
the subjective ways through which citizens relate to the political system. To be more 
precise, the concept of political culture “refers to the specifically political orientations-
attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the 
role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 12). 
It is puzzling that The Civic Culture has not been widely exploited to understand 
populism at a cognitive level, even when it provides rich lines of analysis. In a few 
words, Almond and Verba (1963) propose three types of political culture based on 
cognitions, feelings and evaluations of two elements of political systems—inputs 
(participative institutions, political process) and outputs (administrative process). 
The first type of political culture is referred to as Parochial. It shows almost zero 
orientation to either political process or administrative process. In consequence, 
political roles are neither clear nor specialized. Religious, economic and political 
roles are shared across the head-members of the society. In the second type of 
political culture, referred to as Subject, the administrative process becomes clear. 
Citizens recognize authorities and rules in society but do not participate in the 
decision-making process. Finally, Participant political culture “is one in which the 
members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole 
and to both the political and administrative structures and processes” (Almond and 
Verba, 1963 :18). This type emphasizes the active role of individuals in society and 
in decision-making processes. 
These political cultures are ideal types and, according to the authors, societies 
display mixed political cultures. One of the mixed political cultures is particularly 
interesting for this study: the subject-participant political culture. In this type, one part of 
society is oriented toward active participation, while the other only recognizes the 
outputs of the authorities. This is important because the authors state that populism 
could be found in regimes with this sub-type of political culture. They stress that 
“political systems with mixed subject-participant cultures tend to have populistic 
overtones” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 25-26). Almond and Verba appear to perceive 
populism as a threat to democracy. Regardless of their perspective on this particular 
point, their work to link political culture and populism opens an interesting field 
of exploration.
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1. Theoretical Approach: Populism as Political Discourse
Along the intense but inconclusive debate about the concept of populism, many 
authors have pointed out the confusion and disagreement about this concept in 
the literature (De la Torre, 2013; Jansen, 2011; Weyland, 2001). This paper adopts 
the approach that defines populism as a political style2 which focuses the expressive 
aspects of leaders, such as their political discourse (De la Torre, 2013; Freidenberg, 
2007; Hawkings, 2009; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004; Weyland, 2001). Thus, populism 
could be defined as “the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies 
by personalistic leaders that challenge established political or economic elites on 
behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or “the people”” (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 6). 
Additionally, the political style perspective underlines the “Manichean discourse 
that polarizes society between two antagonistic sides: people and oligarchy” (De la 
Torre, 2013: 26). From our perspective, both We consider this approach effective to 
tackle the main object of this study: political discourse and its effects on citizens’ 
attitudes towards democracy and institutions.
Tackling populism as a political discourse has some advantages, as Hawkings 
(2009) pointed out. The first is the smooth transit to the operationalization of the 
concept. Treating populism as a political discourse makes clearer the collection of 
the required data to measure the concept. Second, this approach overcome the 
longstanding and traditional definitions used to study populism in Latin America, 
such as the structuralist, political-institutional, and economic definitions. These 
previous definitions emphasize different aspects of the phenomena. Structuralist 
definitions link populism with specific states of development of societies; economic 
definitions stress the policy outputs that appeal to the poor; and political-institutional 
approximations focus the analysis on the battle over the control not only for the 
control of the government, but also for the core values of the society (Hawkings, 
2009).
The discursive approach “sees populism as a Manichaean discourse that identifies 
good with a unified will of the people and evil with a conspiring elite” (Hawkings, 
2002: 1042). This definition put the accent on the set of ideas, words and meanings 
rather than on the specific actions taken by actors. It is worth to note that this 
approach to ideas and meanings does not imply an ideological perspective of 
populism. Most important for this definition is the linguistic form, and the only 
common fashion is the Manichean discourse which set a battle between good 
(associated with the people) and the evil (linked to the elites). 
2 For a complete discussion about the concept of populism see Weyland (2001).
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2. Methodological Approach
This study could be considered our first approach to understanding the relationship 
between populist discourse and political culture. Accordingly, it shows exploratory 
analyses and intends to find the key features of the problem rather than stating firm 
conclusions about it. The research design is based on a comparative multi-method 
strategy with two cases. Some authors name this research design as a case study 
or cross-case study (Gerring, 2007; Goertz, 2013). The logic that underlines this 
research design prioritizes the difference between cases and the representativeness 
of each case (Goertz, 2013). Gerring (2007) argues that “cases must be similar to 
each other in whatever respects might affect the causal relationship (…), or such 
differences must be controlled for” (Gerring, 2007: 50). 
Following this logic, we compare two different cases within the same universe 
(populist and non-populist leaders from leftist governments in Latin America) 
and measure variations (in political culture) within each case and across cases. As 
mentioned previously, the cases are the governments of Rafael Correa in Ecuador 
and José Mujica in Uruguay. Both simultaneously represent Latin America’s left 
turn, while also demonstrating the differences in the populist discourse of its leaders 
and the political cultures they manifest. We aim to find clear differences on this 
variable. Our theoretical approach suggests that, despite being part of the same 
ideological spectrum, Correa is a populist leader while Mujica is not. Empirical 
evidence of their political discourses should allow us to assess that assumption. 
In addition, we compare the political cultures of both countries to identify 
differences before and after the governments of Correa and Mujica, respectively. 
We hypothesize that populist discourse will affect citizens’ political orientations and 
attitudes toward democracy. Accordingly, we expect to find that after many years 
of exposure to Correa’s populist discourse, political culture in Ecuador is a close 
approximation to the description of the mixed Parochial-Subject type proposed by 
Almond and Verba (1963). Conversely, we expect that political culture in Uruguay 
does not result in changes of political orientations as far as society has not been 
exposed to populist discourse.
To measure political discourse, we collected presidential speeches that Correa and 
Mujica delivered. These speeches were taken from office web pages, independent 
projects and the media3. Due to availability and time constraints, we collected 19 of 
Correa’s speeches across his eight years in office (10 addressed to the international 
community and 9 to Ecuadorian citizens) and 9 of Mujica’s speeches from his five 
3 Rafael Correa’s speeches were taken from presidencia.gob.ec/discursos/ while José Mujica’s 
speeches were taken from the project: www.beersandpolitics.com/discursos/ and from http://
www.sermedico.com.uy/calidad/-/asset_publisher/yOaHEc6P1wBP/content/lea-el-discurso-
completo-de-mujica. 
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years in office (4 addressed to the international community and 5 to Uruguayan 
citizens)4. We then used a quantitative discourse analysis software5 to observe the 
discursive features of each leader discourse. This tool allowed us to not only observe 
the occurrence of words, but also establish categories and “rhetorical distances” 
between leaders through cluster analysis and similarity analysis. 
The other variation we looked for was differences in the political culture of 
Ecuadorian and Uruguayan citizens. To do so, we used survey data from the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project6 across four points of time to observe variation in 
the political culture of each country. We studied two surveys before the election and 
two surveys after the election of Correa and Mujica, respectively. In order to assess 
the configuration of political culture and in line with most political culture studies 
based on survey data (i.e.: Silver, 2000) we observed indicators on the following 
topics: Political System Support, Tolerance, Positive-Negative Participation, and 
Democracy. Not all of the indicators of these dimensions have been processed, but 
we believe the most important ones are included in this study (See Appendix 1 for 
details about codes and questions for each indicator and the dimensions used in this 
study). LAPOP uses a stratified, multi-stage cluster sampling method. Stratification 
is based on factors such as urban/rural areas and regions to improve the quality of 
the data7. 
3. Results
Quantitative discourse analysis of Correa and Mujica’s speeches confirms that 
both presidents demonstrate differences in their political styles. We note that they 
adjust the content of their speeches depending on whether the audience is the 
international community or the citizens of their respective countries. Beyond the 
obviousness of this fact, quantitative discourse analysis shows that these differences 
depend not just on the audience, but also the preferences of the leaders themselves. 
For example, the 12 most frequent words each leader uses establish large distances 
among their political styles (Fig.1). For instance, when Correa talks to an international 
audience, his most frequent words are: ‘capital’, ‘international’, ‘ours’, ‘America’, 
‘regional’, ‘unite’, ‘bank’. When he talks to his fellow citizens, in contrast, the 
4 However is important to note that, like in quiantitative sampling, more text will not add more 
relevant data in favor of better inferences.
5 We used IRAMUTEQ, which is a free and open code software licensed as GNU GPL (v2). 
IRAMUTEQ provides users with statistical analysis on text corpus and tables composed by 
individuals/words. It is based on R software and on python language. IRAMUTEQ was developed 
by Pierre Ratinaud (2009).
6 We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the 
United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and 
Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.
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most frequent words are: ‘law’, ‘remove’, ‘Ecuadorian’, ‘revolution’, ‘public’, ‘salary’, 
‘family’, ‘homeland’, among others. In turn, when Mujica talks to an international 
audience he frequently uses the following words: ‘life’, ‘civilization’, ‘man’, ‘world’, 
‘struggle’, ‘planet’, ‘capable’, ‘History’, ‘power’, ‘science’. However, when he talks 
to Uruguayans his most frequent words are: ‘nonconformity’, ‘intellectual’, ‘go’, 
‘Uruguayan’, ‘intelligence’, ‘pleasure’, ‘party’, ‘go around’, ‘people’, among others. 
Moreover, the words utilized most frequently by each president are unlikely to be 
utilized by the other.
Furthermore, quantitative discourse analysis seems to confirm the “material” 
component of populist political discourse (Hawkins 2009). It is possible to argue 
that ‘real’ actions and topics are used by populist discourse to provide a basis for 
polarization and confrontation. In other words, populist discourse works better 
with real issues to fight for (or against). This is observed in Correa’s speech to 
the international community, in which he regularly refers to ‘capital’, ‘banks’, and 
‘development’. In contrast, Mujica talks about ‘life’, ‘civilization’, and ‘History’. In 
turn, Correa’s speeches to a national audience Correa focus on ‘law’, ‘revolution’, 
and ‘salary’, while Mujica’s refer to ‘nonconformity’, ‘intellect’, and ‘pleasure’. We 
can link these differences in rhetoric to ‘material’ and ‘abstract’, or non-material 
issues, respectively. These differences in content highlight more nuanced details of 
the political discourse of each president. 
Figure 1.
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The correspondence factor analysis8 shows that more ‘distance’ exists among 
Correa’s speeches (international versus national) than among Mujica’s speeches 
(international versus national). Moreover, there is a clear distance between the two 
leaders in general (Fig. 2). This evidence seems to suggest that Mujica’s political 
discourse is more coherent than that of Correa, and also provides empirical support 
of their classification as different types of leaderships (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). 
Nevertheless, is not clear that the content of their political discourses reflect the 
features that other authors have pointed to as the main characteristics of populism: 
society polarization between the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’, and challenges to the elites. 
This particular finding could be related to Bos, van der Brug and de Vreese (2012) 
suggestion about the different effects of political rhetoric and style. In consequence, 
it appears that what defines a leader as a populist, at least from a discursive 
perspective, is not just what he or she says, but also how he or she expresses what 
they say. Beyond this discussion, we have enough evidence to suggest that Correa is 
a populist leader with respect to political discourse, while Mujica is not. 
Figure 2.
Correspondence Factor Analysis of Correa and Mujica discourses. Forms correctly 
classified: 78,3%.
Source: own elaboration.
8 This analysis associates texts with variables or modes, and allows to analyze texts according to 
characterization of the variables or modes (Camargo and Justo, 2016). For instance, modes are 
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With respect to variations in political culture, the results seem to disprove our 
hypothesis. (although they are not conclusive). As stated above, the measurement 
of political culture is based on the dimensions of Political System Support, Political 
Participation, Tolerance, and Support of Democracy from the LAPOP surveys (see 
Appendix 1 for detailed information). For the first three dimensions, the data show 
almost no changes across the whole period. Namely, there is almost no variation in 
political culture before and after the elections of Correa and Mujica, respectively. 
However, variation is clearly evident across the other dimension and will be 
discussed below. 
Based on the dimensions of Political System Support, Tolerance and Participation, 
we found modest variations in political culture in both countries across time. 
For example, the variance of Political System Support in Ecuador is 0.22, 0.07 
for Tolerance, and 0.12 for Participation. In Uruguay the variances for the same 
dimensions are 0.05, 0.13, and 0.06, respectively. Standard deviations show the 
same pattern. These results could be strong evidence against our hypothesis. Indeed, 
if there is no variation in political culture after a period of exposure to populist 
discourse, then the discourse has no effect on citizen’s attitudes. 
Figure 3.
Variations of political culture in two countries (Ecuador -dashed- and Uruguay 
-solid-) Each point is the result of the arithmetic mean of the indicators included 
on each dimension for a year
Source: own elaboration.
18 Política / Revista de Ciencia Política
Populist discourse and civic culture: Insights from Latin America
However, when we focus the remaining dimension, the data appears to show 
something different. We analyze separately the dimension of Support for Democracy 
because its response options are measured with dichotomous or ternary options 
rather than with a scale (i. e.: 1-7). In other words, the Support for Democracy 
dimension provides respondents with two or three mutually exclusive options for 
each question (Fig. 4). This indicator reveals the proportion of people in a country 
that have chosen one option over others (usually respondents have to choose between 
democratic and non-democratic options). Thus, it is not possible to compare this 
dimension with those that ask for the degree of agreement or disagreement with 
respect to an affirmation. 
The interesting insight from this data is the wide variation in Ecuador as compared 
to Uruguay. Standard deviations confirm that while Support for Democracy 
remains almost the same in Uruguay across the last decade, it has experienced 
important changes in Ecuador. A brief discussion of the first indicator, which 
asks if a government that rules with an iron fist or with everyone’s participation 
is preferable, illustrates this divergent pattern. In Ecuador, the standard deviation 
of responses in Ecuador is 7.19, while in Uruguay it is 2.91. In the indicator with 
three excluding options (“For people like me it doesn’t matter whether a regime 
is democratic or non-democratic”; “Democracy is preferable to any other form of 
government”; or “Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may 
be preferable to a democratic one”), Ecuador has standard deviations of 6.09, 7.49 
and 4.37, while Uruguay 0.92, 2.13 and 1.46, respectively. Finally, for the last pair 
of options (if a “strong leader that does not have to be elected” is preferable or if 
“electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best”) Ecuador shows a standard 
deviation of 4.41 and Uruguay 0.55. It is clear that all of the indicators on this 
dimension show higher levels of variation in Ecuador than in Uruguay.
In fact, it is interesting to note that before the election of Correa in Ecuador, almost 
40% of the population preferred “a government that ruled with an iron fist” rather 
than “everyone’s participation”. This number decreased to 22.94% after Correa 
was first elected in 2006 and increased again to 31% in 2012. Similarly, 64,73% of 
Ecuadorians said that “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government” 
in 2004. This number increased to 82.47% in 2010, and then decreased to 69.64% 
in 2012. By contrast, Uruguayans show strong agreement over time across almost all 
indicators on Support to Democracy, particularly when asked if electoral democracy 
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Figure 4.
Variations in Support to Democracy indicators in two countries (Ecuador -red- 
and Uruguay -blue-). Note that the two first affirmations in the legend are 
paired within the same dichotomous indicator (i.e.: Iron fist versus everyone’s 
participation), as well as the two last. Likewise, the three middle affirmations 
correspond to one indicator.
Source: own elaboration.
Conclusions 
The partial refutation of our hypothesis suggests new questions about the relation 
between populist discourse and political culture. First, it is not clear that political 
discourse affects political culture in a particular society. On the contrary, it seems 
that a particular configuration of political culture is a necessary condition for the 
success of populist discourse. The question that arises is to what extent a particular 
configuration of political culture defines the features of the political system. Is this 
particular configuration of political culture a necessary condition for a more or less 
democratic political regime? Almond and Verba (1963) suggested that democratic 
stability rests on the correspondence between characteristics of political culture and 
political system.
Second, the unit of aggregation to measure political culture could be important. If 
we understand political culture as a particular configuration of people’s attitudes, 
we should inspect as many different aggregations as possible, such as ethnic, class, 
education, ideology, etcetera (some studies on this perspective are Silver, 2000; 
Van Der Brug and De Vreese, 2012). Further study along this line could consider 
variations in political culture, with special attention given to these “cleavages”. 
Third, as far as we followed a particular definition of populism, we didn’t go into 
detail about the discussion of populism’s casual mechanisms, yet we made an 
interesting approach through the concept of political culture. Our data analysis 
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suggests rhetoric is not a defining feature of populist discourse. Namely, if we 
understand populist discourse defined by its polarizing and challenging features, 
these features are not present in the content of discourses. This finding corroborates 
the distinction between populist rhetoric and populist style (Van Der Brug and de 
Vreese, 2012). In any case, we believe further analyses of the micro level explanations 
of populism should explore the causal mechanisms focusing on psycho-political 
features like framing and social representations, among others.
Four, the different patterns of variation in the political cultures of Ecuador and 
Uruguay could be related to at least two facts. First, Ecuador experienced an 
economic and political crisis preceding Correa’s election. A similar crisis did not 
occur before Mujica’s election in Uruguay. This element suggests that stability of a 
democracy (economic and political) impacts the political culture and rise of populist 
leaders, appearing to confirm the medium level explanations about the causes of 
populism. Namely: 
Repeated economic crises and the worsening of economic inequality 
in the world has turned voters against mainstream parties for their 
failure to implement the necessary reforms and contain crisis. This 
argument has a particular resonance for the rise of populism in 
developing countries, where democratic governance is relatively weak 
and corruption is both widespread and systematic. These conditions 
provide fertile ground for populist movements, which appear in 
cyclical fashion once democratic culture becomes the norm (Pappas 
and Hawkins, 2016: 2). 
On the other hand, time has different effects in the two countries. Ecuador shows 
an interesting pattern of increase and decrease of democratic values across time, 
while Uruguay shows almost no changes. Among other causes, this variation could 
reflect different levels of satisfaction with political and economic outcomes in each 
country. If so, it is possible to argue the political system’s stability does not explain 
everything about populism, but could be a necessary condition for its existence. 
Moreover, if we put together all these arguments, we could say that political stability 
and a participant political culture are necessary conditions for the non-occurrence 
of populism. To illustrate, the success of populist discourse seems very difficult in 
a country with strong institutions and with a people who share strong democratic 
values at the same time. Further research should explore this idea across more cases.
Finally, we subscribe to the methodological approach and tradition expressed by 
Hawkins (2009). “After all (…) this is still an attempt to quantify what some may 
see as unquantifiable, and it glosses over important qualitative distinctions that we 
can only see by closely analyzing particular speeches”. We maintain a positivist 
methodology to empirically assess the features and reasons of political phenomena. 
One last question remains after this discussion. If populist discourse succeeds only 
21
Julián Martínez Ramos
Vol. 56, N°2 (2018)
when it corresponds with a particular configuration of political culture, do we have 
the leaders we deserve?
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Appendix
Table 2.
Dimensions of political culture.










To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic 






To what extent do you think that one should sup-





To what extent would you say the current admin-






Democracy may have problems, but it is better than 
any other form of government. To what extent do 
you agree or disagree with this statement?
1-7
Tolerance d1
There are people who only say bad things about the 
(country) form of government, not just the incum-
bent government but the system of government. 
How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such 
people’s right to vote?
1-10
Tolerance d2
How strongly do you approve or disapprove that 
such people be allowed to conduct peaceful dem-
onstrations in order to express their views?
1-10
Tolerance d3
Still thinking of those who only say bad things 
about the (country) form of government, how 
strongly do you approve or disapprove of such peo-
ple being permitted to run for public office?
1-10
Tolerance d4
How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such 





Of people working for campaigns for a political 






Of people participating in legal demonstrations. 
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Of people participating in an organization or group 
to try to solve community problems. How much do 





With which of the following statements do you 
agree with the most: (1) For people like me it 
doesn’t matter whether a regime is democratic or 
non-democratic. (2) Democracy is preferable to 
any other form of government. (3) Under some 
circumstances an authoritarian government may be 





Do you think that our country needs a government 






There are people who say that we need a strong 
leader that does not have to be elected. Others say 
that although things may not work, electoral de-
mocracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What 
do you think?
0-1
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2016).

